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Is cooperative action modern or old fashioned? Why should policymakers pursue it in 
development strategies? In what way are cooperatives different in terms of economic 
theory and organisation theory? And if there are differences in organisation, human 
resource management practices, property rights and forms of collective action, what are 
the governance issues to be addressed so as to allow cooperatives to operate and grow 
correctly? Taking recent Italian debate about a controversial takeover bid launched by 
Italian cooperatives in the banking sector as its starting point, this paper endeavours to put 
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Introduction  
This paper was written against the background of animated discussion in Italy on the role 
of cooperation. A large, traditional insurance company controlled by numerous cooperative 
firms attempted a stock-market takeover of a major Italian bank with the aim of creating a 
cooperative banking and insurance corporation. 
The takeover bid failed because of opposition on the part of Italy’s central bank and 
alleged scandals involving the top management of the insurance company, which is 
controlled by the cooperative movement connected with the Lega delle Cooperative. 
The birth of a cooperative enterprise is characterized by the primacy accorded to 
collaborative association between people, be they consumers, users or entrepreneurs. 
The motivation, involvement and participation
1 of workers have become very modern 
priorities in our post-Ford economy even for the most battle-hardened multinationals. 
In the present-day West European societies, characterized by mature democracy and the 
disappearance of ideologies and mass movements, the capacity for association among 
individuals has become a precious asset to be protected and cultivated, above all in areas 
that have not never known intense and constant social mobilisation and have always 




Cooperatives in our economies 
Flexible specialization is the most successful organisational model in the new “industrial 
paradigm” (Sabel 1984) characterized by transition from the standardised mass production 
of similar goods by means of specific and non-flexible machines to non-standardised 
production where organisation performs the task of adapting flexible plant to uncertain 
markets. The winning formula in this new paradigm is no longer the large-scale integrated   4
company but the small firm capable of working with its neighbours to develop technical 
and human organisational capacity enabling it to adapt to market fluctuations and changes 
in the tastes and needs of consumers. The model that has emerged is based on growing 
integration, cooperation and competition between enterprises that belong to the same 
network. 
The traditional industrial paradigm prompting the pursuit of concentration and economies 
of scale is giving way – or at least according equal importance – to the model of networks, 
flexibility, the “soft” integration of districts, alliances, consortiums, and flexible forms of 
shareholding. The form of coordination developed within the network has no hierarchical 
rules and is not based solely on price mechanisms. In other words, we are outside 
Williamson’s market/hierarchy dichotomy (Williamson 1981) and inside a flow of vertical 
(two-way), horizontal (equal) and lateral (decentralized) relations (Ouchi 1980). 
The cooperative firm must find, and indeed has found, its own role in this scenario, one 
that can be brilliant and crucial in the intricately flexible and competitive relations between 
enterprises. It should, however, be pointed out immediately that the cooperative form of 
coordination of economic activities, occupying an intermediate position in the hierarchy-
market continuum, is intrinsically difficult to achieve (Seravalli, Arrighetti and Wolleb 2001). 
It is the delicate result of balance that supports bottom-up collective action between people 
and firms. Such balance is difficult to establish and maintain in a world increasingly 
dependent and based on information that is witnessing the ever more frequent failure of 
the other two pure forms of coordination, namely hierarchy and the market (consider 
Stiglitz’s works on the consequences of the structural and pervasive lack of information). 
Given this awareness, economic theory has moved well beyond the bipolar hierarchy-
market model and adopted an intermediate formula of transaction regulation, namely the 
clan or the collective (Barney and Ouchi 1985). This intermediate form, which is actually 
the oldest (Douglas 1986), remains the most difficult to establish in everyday practice. (It is   5
no coincidence that hierarchy and market are the solutions most widely adopted.) Though 
difficult to establish, it is, however, necessary and competitive once put in motion. Some 
anthropologists (Mary Douglas herself for example) who have traced back the ancient 
roots of cooperation claim that bottom-up collective action is practically bound to disappear 
in open or large-scale communities. Consider the forms of collective or communitarian 
work that were so widespread not only in all the pre-Columbian communities but also in 
Asia. 
It is by no means irrelevant in this schematic overview to point out that in Europe the pure 
protagonists of the other bipolar model, i.e. state and market, are also proving more and 
more frequently incapable of meeting the demands made on them by the communities. 
Here too, as we shall see, there is an explosion of the bipartite model to make way for an 
intermediate figure, namely the third sector. 
In short, authentic cooperation could suddenly find itself modern, necessary, equipped to 
tackle the challenges of our day, and in some cases a step ahead of the traditional 
companies, which have always regarded it with suspicion and attitude of superiority. 
If this is true, cooperatives have something to offer workers, markets, and the communities 
on which they focus. This paper will examine how government and local authorities can 
help to harness these energies and this ancient modernity. 
 
Between State and Market 
Nearly all the European countries went through a cycle of massive state intervention in the 
economy and a phase of privatisation and liberalisation between 1945 and 2005. After the 
most important experience of state control in West Europe in the post-war years, the 
Italian economy in particular has been involved in a strong process of privatisation and 
liberalisation since the 1990s (with marked deceleration in the early years of this century). 
Privatisation has been carried out in Italy with courage and determination, even though the   6
ownership structures deriving from the sale of former state-owned concerns have not 
always guaranteed correct transition to a market culture. Not always courageous and not 
always accompanied by adequate action on the part of the authorities responsible for 
control and regulation, liberalisation has produced no results. In other words, many of the 
markets involved in privatisation and liberalisation have not become competitive, many 
former state-owned concerns have not become contestable, many of the economic agents 
that have taken over from the state in the control of utilities, banks and industrial concerns 
have shown no desire or ability to operate with an adequate entrepreneurial market 
culture. 
Italian citizens have seen a slow but constant decline in the services provided by the 
welfare state since the 1990s. 
The retreat of the state with respect to certain demands expressed by citizens, the rise of a 
new private-sector entrepreneurial class with much the same oligopolistic tendencies and 
no greater concern for the customers and users of regulated markets, the internal political 
instability caused by the crisis of the “First Republic”, and demographic changes have 
unquestionably been major factors of stress for Italian society. 
A still more important and often crucial role for social stability and economic plurality 
(Spear 2000) has been assumed in this context by intermediaries between state and 
market, individual and society, enterprise and citizen. The phenomenon appears to be 
common to most of the European continent but particularly intense in Italy, which 
underwent a radical political crisis in the 1990s that has yet to find resolution in a mature 
bipolar system. The demographic figures show marked aging of the population 
accompanied by the perception of reduced security and stability. In economic and 
institutional terms, we can see an industrial crisis due primarily to productive specialisation 
accompanied by historical inefficiency in the public sector.   7
Let us consider the rapid growth of associative participation and voluntary service, the new 
leading role of cooperatives, the debate on the civil economy and the social responsibility 
of firms, and the growing interest in non-profit concerns and the third sector.  
This world – both associative and entrepreneurial, both for-profit and non-profit – 
constitutes not only a buffer between the two other major components of the western 
societies and economies but also in many cases a necessary contribution to the correct 
functioning of a plural, efficient, competitive market with respect for the consumer, the user 
and the citizen. It is, however, no easy matter to explain and defend the importance of 
these organisational forms in a world that is so uninterested in economic pluralism and 
practically convinced that we have indeed arrived at the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), 
at least on the economic front. History has not, however, come to an end, at least in the 
sense that there are different forms of market economy (Albert 1991) and different forms of 
company and company ownership as well as very different ways of running a firm in a 
market economy. 
 
Identity and role 
The internal and external debate on cooperative values and identity has in any case 
regained present-day relevance and intensity. The question arises of whether there are 
qualitative or quantitative limitations to be placed on the operations of cooperatives to 
ensure protection of their identity. 
Cooperatives can hold shares in companies, including those quoted on the stock 
exchange. Even though there are few who believe that cooperatives should remain small 
and residual, there is discussion in Italy today about the need for limits to ensure that such 
shares are held with a view to the best possible pursuit of the cooperative’s mutualist 
objectives.
3 While we believe it important for the plurality (Hansmann 1996) of the Italian 
economy
4 that cooperatives should be able to operate in all sectors and all markets, it is   8
equally important that this should take place in accordance with the identity of the 
cooperative movement and its primary values, such as mutualism and democracy (Olsen 
2002). The lack of homogeneity in the characteristics of the firms operating in a market 
increases the capacity to meet the needs expressed in that market. (“There is a place in a 
modern mixed market economy for a model of business that is driven by the needs of the 
people who use its services rather than those who invest their capital in it. Indeed such 
forms assist the efficient and sustainable functioning of markets.” Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001) 
Regardless of the economic and social sector of action, we believe on the whole that 
cooperation of the first, second and third degree can be seen as a tool or logic of corporate 
integration. There is a need for integration both at the national level (in a country like Italy, 
suffering from industrial dwarfism and now discovering to its cost that small is beautiful but 
not sufficient) and at the European level, where it is becoming essential in an ever-
increasing number of industrial sectors to attain the supranational critical mass needed to 
operate on the global markets. 
Cooperatives must make integration at group and sector level their watchword. They must 
experiment with processes of internationalisation and strengthen their international 
partnerships: not only a presence on foreign markets but also integration with other 
cooperative concerns. Interest attaches in this connection to a number of developments in 
Europe, e.g. the integration achieved between Danish and Swedish cooperatives. There 
are, however, also more streamlined forms of collaboration. For example, cooperatives 
from different countries can set up joint enterprises to market their products. Given the 
territorial nature of the cooperatives participating and the international dimension of the 
strategy adopted, cases of this type have been described as instances of authentic 
glocalism. 
   9
We are convinced that cooperatives can demonstrate that it is possible to “square the 
circle” (Dahrendorf 1996), combining competitiveness and innovation, territorial roots and 
social and environmental sustainability. Cooperatives should accept this challenge and 
blaze an exemplary trail for other economic concerns. 
While cooperatives can certainly make a contribution, the regulating authorities must be 
fully convinced and aware that cooperation is a delicate plant that grows spontaneously 
but is not an aggressive weed. The spontaneity of cooperatives stems from the innate 
human tendency to work together. In the works produced immediately after his famous 
treatise on competition in the animal world, Darwin himself took pains to point out (not 
least in order to counter the apocryphal readings that have continued up to our day) that 
human evolution, unlike its animal counterpart, is based on cooperation, altruism and love 
rather than competition, selection and struggle. Moreover, this collaboration is not only 
typical of poor or struggling economies and communities. The cooperative lends itself to 
human collaboration in the satisfaction of both basic and higher needs. The cooperative 
serves to set up a store in poor, isolated village, to organise free and secure work, and to 
fight unemployment or exploitation but also to offer work with greater fulfilment and 
autonomy, to foster the spread of socially and environmentally sustainable foodstuffs, or 
indeed to buy and run an otherwise inaccessible sailing boat. In short, cooperation is a tool 
serving to overcome difficulties and the state of necessity or simply to meet higher 




Though spontaneous and innate in human beings, as pointed out above, this form of 
organisation in also rare, not least because the cooperative formula requires specific 
ingredients that are not always readily available everywhere. Cooperatives are organised   10
in a different way, for example, given that participation and democracy have organisational 
consequences. The participation of cooperative members and workers rests on different 
motivations from those operating in traditional firms. Some have spoken of “ideological 
workers” (Rose Ackerman 1986) and some of “ideological organisations”  (Mintzberg 
1996). The role of the trade union and the functioning of industrial relations are also 
different. With respect to the tripolar model of market, hierarchy and clan (Barney and 
Ouchi 1986), it seems possible to suggest that the transactions of cooperatives and their 
members are potentially subject in some cases to considerations not only of price but also 
of hierarchy and trust. With reference to Hirschman (1970), it seems possible to state that 
the weapons of exit, voice and loyalty are sometimes simultaneously available to 
cooperatives and their members. While having three weapons in one’s hand may prove 
very useful in some cases, however, it can also prevent reaction in others. In any case, 
cooperative behaviours are the result of equilibrium in situations of heterogeneity as 
regards aims, conduct, and the agents themselves (Spear 2004). 
 
As shown by Axelrod, cooperative interaction is rare but possible and potentially stable, 
above all in a medium-term evolutionary and iterative perspective. The actors can learn to 
cooperate from the experience of previous interaction, they can be induced to do so 
through sunk investment, or they can be institutionally directed toward cooperation. 
 
In short, bottom-up collective cooperative action is more complex. This complexity must be 
handled and supported to ensure that it takes shape in strengths rather than weaknesses.  
Cooperative firms are non-capitalist enterprises in that the ownership rights are not 
contestable.
5 A cooperative is created in order to provide a service for its members and to 
do so with a democratic and transparent form of management based on participation. It is 
created in order to foster entrepreneurship in accordance with the territorial nature of the   11
enterprise and the freedom of entry and exit for members. Cooperatives are enterprises 
controlled by workers (or users or associated entrepreneurs). As Zamagni (2001, 2005) 
points out, the primary objective of the cooperative is “not the maximization of profit, as it is 
for the capitalist enterprise, but maximization of the social dividend defined as the 
difference between revenues and costs (but not including labour costs) divided by the 
number of members. This means that while in the capital-based enterprise profit is a 
residue that ends up in the hands of the owners and wages are a constraint, the exact 
opposite is true in the cooperative firm, where the remuneration of the holders of the 
capital is a constraint and the social dividend a residue.” Actually every economic 
explanation of the cooperative difference is not valid for every type of cooperative. This 
last one, as an example, is valid only for worker cooperative. 
 
Cooperatives and the policy maker 
Cooperative firms are, however, enterprises integrated perfectly into the mechanisms and 
culture of the market economy, and it is precisely in the world’s most advanced market 
economies that they now account for a larger (and often growing) proportion of national 
income. It is precisely in these economic contexts that cooperatives often help to counter 
the effects of market failures. Company control is based on individuals and not on capital 
(per capita voting). These individuals, i.e. the members, forgo the use of their property 
rights because it is impossible for those leaving the cooperative to obtain the increase in 
value of economic capital incorporated in their share of the firm. In return for this sacrifice, 
legislation in many countries offers the benefit of tax exemption on a proportion of the 
profits, to the extent that members (owners) and customers (users) are the same persons, 
no profits can be derived in order to be taxed. In the Italian fiscal policy the tax exemption 
of profits channelled into an indivisible reserve can, however, also be seen in actual fact as 
no more than an incentive to company capitalization. (Similar laws encouraging operative   12
capitalization also exist in certain countries for non-cooperative firms.) For this reason, 
there is nothing extraordinary about the present system capable of damaging the 
functioning of the market. On the one hand, entrepreneurs taking a critical view of the 
advantages enjoyed by cooperatives can convert their firms into cooperatives whenever 
they choose. On the other, tax schemes to encourage capitalization have always existed 
and will continue to do so also for traditional firms. Moreover, all economists, politicians 
and leaders of entrepreneurial organisations with a knowledge of the demographic 
statistics for Italian firms
6 should take great interest in the ability of cooperatives to be 
intergenerational and, in exemplary cases, oriented toward capitalization. The figures for 
the last 15 years clearly indicate a strong tendency toward growth on the part of 
cooperatives, unlike the average Italian firm. 
 
Moreover, current Italian legislation requires cooperatives to allocate 3% of their profits for 
social purposes, which is usually done through the national mutualist funds for training and 
promotion in the cooperative sphere. This legislative provision constitutes one of the 
stimuli behind the efforts of cooperatives in the sector of social solidarity and mutual aid 
(also at the external level), together with their traditional values and ideology. 
 
Those who have questioned in recent months the legitimacy of a joint-stock corporation 
being controlled through the stock market by a company that is a cooperative and hence 
not contestable cannot ignore the fact that none of Italy’s major quoted companies are 
actually contestable on the market because they are controlled by intricate interlocking 
systems of shareholders’ agreements permitting the iron-clad protection of ownership 
rights with minimal amounts of capital. The ownership of unquoted firms is instead 
extremely concentrated and hence equally incontestable. 
   13
Formally or really Cooperative 
All in all, it must be stated again that cooperatives are non-capitalistic but oriented toward 
the market and the pursuit of results ensuring their stability and growth in terms of finances 
and assets. The recent demands for cooperatives to remain in the non-profit area of the 
Italian economy make no sense. On the one hand, not all cooperatives operate in the non 
profit sector, and this is not where the cooperative difference lies. On the other, it must be 
remembered that non-profit organisations are not necessarily bodies endowed with social 
responsibility or those best placed to meet the needs of workers, consumers or users. Nor 
does it make sense, in the light of the above considerations, to call for limits to be 
somehow imposed on the size of cooperative firms or the sectors in which they or their 
subsidiaries can operate. In any case, large and successful cooperatives do not 
necessarily stop being “good” cooperatives. Growth in terms of scale (social base, balance 
sheets, organisational complexity, etc.) and age is not always accompanied by a loss of 
cultural and democratic values. There are no industrial sectors where cooperatives 
maintain or lose their identity by definition. Functional and organisational development is 
not incompatible with preservation of the cooperative identity. It should be borne in mind 
that the same phenomena of false cooperation are already present all over the world from 
Colombia to Chile, from Finland to Spain, which proves that is not even the degree of 
social development and prosperity that fosters or deters them (Bernardi 2005). 
The growth of cooperatives is necessary in many industrial sectors and the tool of the 
cooperative group is useful as well. It is also a good idea to experiment with processes of 
internationalisation and to concentrate the attention of the cooperative movement on the 
need for organisational development and on the question of generational turnover, which 
is currently assuming ever-greater importance. 
 
   14
Diversity 
The problem of false cooperatives unquestionably exists in Italy, and it is in this area that 
the problem of unfair competition comes into play. There are cooperatives in name only, 
where the members have no real right to participate in the decision-making process. 
Current Italian legislation grants tax benefits only to “predominantly mutualist” 
cooperatives, where relations with members account for at least 51% of the business 
(work or sales, depending on the type of cooperative). This indicator is not, however, 
sufficient. Apart from the quantitative yardstick, it is necessary to identify a new system of 
parameters in order to attribute mutualist merit. Not all the “predominantly mutualist” 
cooperatives, in the sense indicated by current legislation, are good cooperatives and 
mutualistically meritorious, and vice versa. The quantitative provision is certainly 
insufficient to assess mutualist merit. Why not propose legislation or a system of voluntary 
certification designed to limit the phenomenon? One possibility would be a national 
cooperative logo with certification of managerial qualities and democratic governance 
(based on an ISO or TQM model accompanied by a social report). The local authorities 
must become more perspicacious in the formulation of calls for tenders to select 
cooperative firms that are meritorious from all points of view. 
 
Cooperative firms seem to be intrinsically organisations oriented toward a lower degree of 
consumption of social capital (Spear 2000). This is not because they are “better” more 
socially responsible by definition – we are indeed well aware that this is not so – but simply 
because the functioning of cooperatives requires the production and use of social capital 
(Fukuyama 1999) rather than consumption. Suffice it to consider the way they are run 
through democratic assemblies, their links of mutual aid with other cooperatives, and the 
extent to which they are rooted in local communities. Suffice it note that the regions with   15
the greatest cooperative tradition and vocation in Italy are those to which Putnam (1993) 
attributes a higher level of public spirit. 
 
It must be said, however, that with the authoritative exceptions of Walras and Alfred 
Marshall (1890), who noted the superiority of the work of the cooperative movement, the 
classical and neoclassical economists have always viewed the cooperative enterprise with 
suspicion and denied the existence of any specific economic behaviour on the part of 
cooperatives in terms of economic theory. Some have indeed endeavoured to 
demonstrate the economic inefficiency and limitations of self-managed enterprises (e.g. 
Einaudi, Pantaleoni and Ward). The opposite approach is instead taken in both the strictly 
economic and the philosophical works of Jaroslav Vanek (1970, 1985, 2000), the 
illustrious economist of Cornell University, who went so far during the last years of his 
intellectual career as to trace the origins of cooperation in the history of Christianity. 
Keynes and Robertson conversed on the macroeconomic effects of the presence of 
cooperatives, as an example, in terms of stability of the economic cycle.  
Another theoretical explanation of the economic significance of cooperative firms suggests 
that their competitive advantage is based on the efforts of consumers to overcome the 
uncertainties associated with the presence of informational asymmetries in the purchasing 
of goods and services. 
 
With reference to the question of diversity and identity, it could be argued that for some 
years now various Italian cooperatives have stopped insisting on their diversity or made an 
effort to become more similar to other firms because of their inability to communicate the 
positive nature of their difference. They have at least stopped proclaiming their diversity in 
terms of capitalistic company control (which remains the only true difference for 
economists). It has for some time now been another difference that is insisted on in image   16
campaigns, in the cooperative corporate identity, and in the conferences of the cooperative 
organisations. This is based on a democratic approach, social solidarity and responsibility, 
the ability to foster local development, and attention to the rights of members and 
consumers. It can also be added that it is intrinsically visible in the tradition of self-
managed and cooperative work that development is freedom (Sen 2001), that the well-
being and autonomy of workers and entrepreneurial success are not only compatible but 
also interconnected. The cooperative image is, however, in need of a boost. The 
cooperative enterprise must be conceived and communicated externally as the form 
ensuring the greatest degree of well-being for workers as well as the most economically 
advantageous conditions for users and consumers. 
A report of the European Commission uses this definition: “A co-operative is an enterprise 
like any other, but it is also an enterprise that exists to serve the needs of the members 
who own and control it, rather than solely to provide a return on investment. All enterprises 
exist to serve the interests of their cardinal stakeholder groups. For traditional companies 
that means investors, however in a co-operative returns on capital (which are in some 
cases permitted) must always be subordinated to other interests. In fact a non-co-
operative enterprise might be called an association of capital (or investor-driven business) 
whereas a co-operative is an association of people (or people-driven business).” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2001). Paradoxically enough, it is precisely 
this very important public report that offers the most striking example of the identity 
problems discussed here. How could the European cooperative movement, which will 
certainly have contributed to the drafting of that report, allow it to be written down, black on 
white, that the cooperative is an enterprise like any other? Cooperatives are very particular 
enterprises indeed and very different from other forms of economic organisation. 
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Life Cycle and change 
This change in attitude with respect to the system is a characteristic that Meister (1969) 
(Table 1) and Zan (1982) (Table 2) noted at the level of the lifecycles of individual 
cooperative organisations and that it appears possible to use metaphorically today in 
discussing the state of the cooperative movement as a whole. Underlying the two tables 
are two different visions of the evolution toward the market, professionalism and efficiency 
of cooperatives. On the one hand, there is optimism that cooperative values and features 
can stand up to competition from capitalist firms; on the other, pessimism that growth, 
reorganisation, and time will irreparably transform the cooperative spirit of the movement. 
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Table 1 – Phases of the cooperative lifecycle according to Meister   18
Phase I  Phase II  Phase III 
Collective enthusiasm  Initial political and economic 
success 
Economic consolidation 




Delegated democracy  Formalisation 
Mechanical solidarity  Crisis of solidarity  Organic solidarity 
Internal closure  Opening of social base  Solution to contradictions 
Union of weaknesses 
 
Rejection of the market 
Acceptance of market  
 
pointing out its contradictions 
Opening up to the outside 
 




Culture of struggle  Culture of market  Culture of assertion on the 
market 
Phase of defence  Phase of consolidation Industrial  phase 
 
Table 2 – Phases of the cooperative lifecycle according to Zan 
 
The partially diverging theses of Zan and Meister are broadly discussed and analysed in a 
recent work on the organisation of cooperatives (Battaglia 2005), which compares Italian, 
European and Latin American case studies in an effort to take stock of the relationship 
between growth, the continued existence of ideological, cultural and participatory 
characteristics, and the external influence of what is known as the cooperative 
organisational field. 
 
One of the identity problems facing cooperative firms today seems to be the search for a 
way to preserve their diversity while complying with most of the rules of the system. It is 
necessary first to consider the cornerstones of this diversity and bring them into line with 
the new requirements of society and the economic system, and second to pursue and 
defend this diversity – or new diversity – through coherent and transparent interaction with   19
the other firms. As Zamagni points out, cooperativism is going through a crisis “in the 
etymological sense of the term, i.e. passage, transition…” 
  
Only when both the national cooperative organisations and the individual firms have 
thoroughly considered the questions of identity and diversity will it be possible to address 
the problem of the growth strategy of the cooperative movement. Only then will it be 
possible to discuss, for example, the advisability of certain financial or industrial 
operations, mergers and alliances, or the instrumental use of capitalistic firms. 
In any case, it already appears obvious that the decision to do without modern 
entrepreneurial tools serving to compete on an equal footing with capitalist (or traditional) 
firms would involve too great a risk. While it would be a mistake, in our view, to impose 
legislative limits on the sectors in which cooperatives can operate, it is undeniably true that 
the cooperative formula proves particularly competitive in some industrial sectors and not 
in others. (It can be suggested initially that this derives from differences in the combination 
of the productive factors of capital and labour in the different industries.) 
 
It then appears equally obvious that the traditional links between Italian cooperative 
organisations and political parties (especially the former Communist and Christian 
Democrat parties) must be reinterpreted in order to meet the new requirements not only of 
cooperation but also of the political sphere and the national economic system. While the 
existence of a cultural matrix is a strength and a source of riches, cooperatives and the 
organisations representing them must maintain their independence with respect to national 
and local politics (and vice versa). Dialogue with all the social and economic actors, 
including the political, is instead indispensable and advisable.  
The consideration of cooperative identity certainly cannot overlook the importance of the 
real degree of democracy and participation in the decision-making processes. There can   20
be no cooperation if member participation is not practised, cultivated and fostered by 
management. Members must be qualitatively and quantitatively involved more frequently 
in the decision-making processes and in the renewal of managerial structures. It is 
necessary to strengthen the mechanisms of democratic participation (e.g. by examining 
the issue of delegation and voting at a distance) so as to avoid any undue increase in the 
powers of managers (sometimes professionals hired from outside) at the expense of the 
membership. 
 
This is a currently relevant problem in Italy but also in the rest of the world. And the role of 
human resources in company competitiveness is far more critical today than in the past all 
over the world. Motivation, empowerment, delegation and participation are becoming 
extremely powerful and indispensable tools above all – but not exclusively – in knowledge-
intensive firms and services. Cooperatives can derive an advantage from this because 
they have been accustomed to worker centrality and involvement from the very outset. 
And then, how can the cooperative tradition not be regarded as modern at a time when so 
many are calling for greater industrial democracy?  
Borzaga (2002) points out that social cooperatives “seem to have succeeded in finding 
ways to govern their strategic factor of production, i.e. labour, that are more efficient than 
those adopted by the public sector, capitalist firms and most of the other non-profit 
organisations. While paying their workers less on average than the other organisations 
operating in the sector of social services, they adopt salary structures that reward seniority 
and loyalty, and appear capable of attracting young educated and motivated workers 
through incentives other than salary (…). It also appears that the social cooperatives have 
succeeded so far in attracting a well-trained and motivated workforce and adopting wage 
and organisational strategies perceived as fair by their workers despite the limited scale of 
their resources.”   21
Control and governance 
We consider it important to return to the question of control over the firm. As Hansmann 
(1996) points out, there are efficiency-related grounds to establish when it is preferable 
that the owner of an enterprise should be one of the possible parties operating in our 
market economies: the entrepreneur, the investor, the state, management, the users, the 
workers, etc. It is context alone that determines the conditions enabling one of these to 
perform the function more efficiently. There should be no prejudices with respect to one or 
more of the potential owners (Olsen 2002). “The freedom of enterprise is a fundamental 
characteristic of the most advanced modern economies. Capitalism, on the contrary, is 
contingent; it is simply the particular form of ownership that most often, but certainly not 
always, proves most efficient with the given technology.” And it is precisely comparison 
and competition between different forms of company control that can produce positive 
effects for the markets. 
 
But are the mechanisms through which the members of a cooperative, the owners of this 
form of enterprise, can supervise and assess its progress adequate today? Since the type 
of ownership is different, there are also differences in the challenges of cooperative 
governance (Cornforth 2004). Corporate governance is to be understood as a set of tools 
(institutions, rules, mechanisms, guarantees) designed to foster a correct decision-making 
process within the company in the interests of the various categories of stakeholders 
(Powell 1987). The problem of governance arises with the separation of ownership and 
management in large-scale corporations. The scandals and industrial crises of the last few 
years have made this a currently relevant problem, and not only in Italy. Cooperative 
business systems with highly fragmented ownership (or rights) require particular attention, 
and this problem is further complicated by the imperfect transferability of ownership rights   22
and the greater number of types
7 of stakeholder in the cooperative. The reform of 
company law has had a partial effect in this sector.
8 
The typical – and opposite – risks are the inability of the member or groups of members to 
exercise the correct degree of control and guidance over management and the inability of 
management to implement adequately competitive strategies enabling the firm to operate 
on the market. It is obviously impossible to address this question without going into the 
details of each type of cooperative.
9 For example, the control over company organs with 
respect to the management of cooperatives making great use of the participation of 
instrumental companies appears to be a very sensitive and critical issue because it is 
more difficult to exercise control, because the risk of deviation with respect to the original 
and statutory objectives is greater, because the divergence of goals between management 
and members is potentially greater, and because of the potential growth of non-
transparent conduct. (At the same time, however, there can also be growth in mutualist 
effectiveness with respect to members or to the competitiveness of the core activities 
managed directly by the cooperative.)  
There are, however, some possible reforms that appear suitable for practically all of the 
cooperative world, including the rotation and limitation of appointments, greater use of 
proxies in general meetings, independence of management, controls over the indirect 
distribution of ownership shares, adequacy of organisational structure in relation to size 
and type of cooperative, certainty of mutualist exchange, adequate information and 
involvement of the grassroots membership, and the coordination of control functions. 
 
Reflection also appears necessary because there is no lack of different schools of thought 
even within the Italian cooperative movement.
10 As regards proxies, for example, those in 
favour are opposed by other who think that democratic participation must be individual 
rather than delegated and that therefore only the former is to be fostered and promoted,   23
e.g. through the mechanism of separate assemblies. Many react very negatively to talk of 
limitations on mandates for company appointments, e.g. by pointing out that no such 
limitations exist in traditional firms.
11 
 
The squaring of the circle can only come about, however, through an understanding of 
cooperative diversity and identity. We are talking about enterprises that differ from others 
starting from their system of ownership rights, enterprises of an initially democratic nature 
that see the fragmentation of their members’ rights increase together with their growth. 
Paradoxically enough, in a context of family entrepreneurship such as obtains in Italy, 
cooperatives are experiencing the centrality of management and the necessary division of 
ownership and management before traditional firms (as happened previously with the 
state-owned companies). It is necessary to consider the risk of the major cooperative firms 
coming to operate like authentic public companies but without some of the safeguards 
provided for quoted companies, e.g. mechanisms of association and representation for 
small shareholders, more stringent procedures of auditing and control, a framework to 
regulate conflicts of interest, etc. It is in any case be possible to argue theoretically that the 
major cooperatives, unlike quoted companies with vast numbers of shareholders, would 
not encounter the typical risk of management oriented toward predominantly short-term 
objectives (being motivated, for example, by reward systems linked to share prices). The 
development of participatory mechanisms with multiple voting involves the risk, however, 
of producing a hybrid in still greater need of innovative mechanisms of governance (Spear 
2004). 
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Conclusions  
The leitmotiv of this discussion appears to be diversity, something often put aside, 
forgotten or viewed with suspicion by the cooperative members themselves. In our view, 
the international cooperative movement should regain its pride in its diversity and use this 
as the basis to reconstruct its identity. 
 
It is possible to trace a consensus in the economic and organisational literature on the 
diversity rather than the superiority or inferiority of the cooperative entrepreneurial formula. 
In particular, diversity combined with the characteristics of markets and technologies 
becomes a competitive advantage in some industrial sectors and a disadvantage in others. 
We believe, however, that it must be the market and not legislation that sets limits on the 
operations of cooperatives. We believe that the residual tax benefits granted to 
cooperatives in Italy and many other countries are prompted by their diversity and in no 
way prejudicial to the corrected functioning of markets. These advantages are in any case 
available to anyone opting for the cooperative form of enterprise. Cooperatives do not ask 
for privileges. The treatment they receive must remain partially different because they are 
inherently different. 
 
The strategy for the next one hundred years of cooperation in Italy needs to address the 
question of cooperative diversity and identity. In any case, an understanding of present-
day diversity is essential, for example, to the use of forms of training capable of guiding 
cooperative management toward ethical diversity and an understanding of the 
organisational and operational peculiarities of enterprises of the cooperative type. 
Cooperative management must be able to operate in a different type of firm but must also 
be equipped with the entrepreneurial tools used by non-cooperative companies. 
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Cooperative firms are different and must remain so. Their ancient modernity is the strength 
upon which they can draw in addressing the market for human services. It is certainly not a 
good idea to conceal the need for entrepreneurial and organisational development. 
Cooperatives must be capable of coping with generational turnover and handling the 
degree of organisational development that is indispensable for healthy growth. Growth 
must be managed but is essential in many industrial sectors for firms wishing to be 
competitive at the national and international level. 
                                                 
1 See in this connection the partial results of the Metatrend 2004 study carried out by the CRORA research 
centre on business organisation of the Bocconi University under the supervision of Anna Grandori, which 
draws attention to the competitive importance of mechanisms of organisational equity and democracy in 
firms. 
2 Putnam’s notion of social capital is linked to the concept of civic tradition and is a collective asset rather 
than a resource enjoyed by individuals. Bourdieu’s is less tied to the tradition of a certain community: “Social 
capital is the set of actual or potential resources connected with the possession of a lasting network of more 
or less institutionalised relations of reciprocal knowledge and recognition, i.e. with belonging to a group (…). 
The volume of social capital possessed by a particular agent therefore depends on the scale of the network 
of connections that he can effectively mobilise and by the volume of capital (economic, cultural and 
symbolic) held by each of those with whom he is connected.” The view put forward by Fukuyama is oriented 
toward the idea of trust and the sharing of values. Other views occupy an intermediate position between the 
ideas of the relational network and a shared tradition of values and trust. 
3 Some cooperative managers have, for example, called for legislation taking into account new forms of 
mutualism, e.g. at the group level. 
4 Plurality of forms of enterprise and ownership structure: ownership by shareholders, workers, users, or in 
some cases (why not?) through public shareholding. 
5 The very concept of economic capital loses its meaning because it is impossible to transfer or sell the 
enterprise. 
6 Dwarfism and difficulties in handling family succession are critical issues in the Italian entrepreneurial 
system. 
7 In some cases, for example, there are theoretically clashes between the interests of the member and the 
worker or the member and the consumer, stakeholders that are often represented, however, by the same 
individuals. Moreover, the benefits that members wish to derive from their membership of the cooperative are 
nearly always much more complex than those of the shareholders of public companies, who expect no more 
than dividends and capital gains. Nor are they always and exclusively of an economic nature. 
8 As a result of the reform of company law, the traditional system of a board of directors or single chief 
executive is now flanked by the “dualistic” and “monistic” systems. Under the dualistic system (of German 
derivation), responsibility for management and control is assigned to a supervisory board, appointed by the 
general meeting, and a management board appointed directly by the supervisory board, which also approves 
the balance sheet. Under the monistic system (of Anglo-Saxon derivation), responsibilities for management 
and control are instead assigned respectively to the board of directors, appointed by the general meeting, 
and a committee for management control set up within the same, the members of which must possess 
particular requisites of independence and professional expertise. 
9 Size is also a crucial variable. Structure and mechanisms of control differ greatly from the viewpoint of 
organisation theory and economic theory depending on whether the cooperative is small, medium or large. 
10 There are even differences of opinion as regards the question of increasing the ratio of member workers to 
non-member workers or the need to accelerate decision-making processes. The debate on governance is 
also open, however, with respect to non-cooperative firms. 
11 The problem of the effective nature of members’ rights also exists, however, in associations, trade unions 
and political parties.   26
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